Theaterisation of Military in India, Challenges, Air Force Concerns and the Way Forward

By Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired)

The Indian Armed Forces are currently undergoing a major transformation aimed at improving jointness, resource optimization, and operational efficiency. The creations of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) in 2019 were historic steps toward integration. The next logical move in this reform process is theaterisation, which refers to the establishment of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs) a structure in which specific resources from the Army, Navy, and Air Force are pooled under single commanders for various geographical or threat-centric theatres of operations. However, this reform has faced significant resistance, particularly from the Indian Air Force (IAF), due to apprehensions about the potential fragmentation of air power. Another critical question also arises: what happens to the existing 17 Service Commands? Should they be abolished or coexist with the new theatre commands?

The rationale behind theaterisation stems from the need to address the weaknesses in the current system. Presently, the three Services focus largely on protecting their own domains through Service-specific commands rather than integrating optimally for combined operational efficiency. Theaterisation would address these weaknesses by ensuring unity of command, wherein a single operational commander could reduce delays and enhance synergy in combat. It would also lead to integrated planning and resource pooling across Services, preventing duplication and wastage. Under the current setup, coordination between multiple Service Chiefs during crises slows response times, while an ITC would allow for faster decision-making.

India faces a two-front challenge from China and Pakistan, alongside emerging threats in the cyber and space domains. An integrated command would be better positioned to handle such multi-domain challenges. Major powers such as the United States and China already operate through theatre commands China’s Western Theatre Command, for instance, specifically focuses on the Indian frontier. Clearly, the rationale for joint commands is compelling. However, structural change must be sensitive to the operational realities of each Service.

At present, the three Services operate 17 Service-specific commands: the Indian Army has seven (Northern, Western, Eastern, Southern, Central, South-Western, and Training Command or ARTRAC), the Indian Air Force has seven (Western, Eastern, Southern, Central, South-Western, Maintenance, and Training Commands), and the Indian Navy has three (Western, Eastern, and Southern Commands). Many of these commands have overlapping areas of responsibility. For example, the Army’s Northern Command, the IAF’s Western Air Command, and the Navy’s Western Command all operate in regions that require close coordination during conflict.

The new proposal under consideration envisions the creation of three integrated theatres — the Northern Theatre Command focusing on the China border (Ladakh and the North-East), the Western Theatre Command covering the Pakistan front, and the Maritime Theatre Command overseeing the Indian Ocean Region. Additionally, an Air Defence Command may be established for pan-India air and missile defence. The intent is to merge the operational responsibilities of the existing 17 Service-specific commands into these three or four integrated structures.

The IAF has expressed several concerns regarding Theaterisation. These include the shortage of combat air assets and the related risk of their fragmentation, potential restrictions on the agility of air power especially in a two-front scenario — dilution of its strategic role, and differences in role philosophy, as the Air Force traditionally prefers functional rather than geographical commands. While some of these concerns are valid, others appear to stem from institutional turf protection. The Indian military needs to proceed with theaterisation in the interest of optimizing resource utilization, especially at a time when modernization and capacity building across all three Services are lagging. Left to the current soloed approach, the Services will continue to focus on their individual modernization goals, to the detriment of overall military efficiency.

Nevertheless, some of the IAF’s objections, particularly those linked to its current resource constraints, must be addressed within the new framework. Budgetary and resource limitations must also be considered while implementing such restructuring. Globally, lessons can be drawn from models adopted by the United States and China. In the US, theatre commanders exist, but the US Air Force retains global strike assets under Air Combat Command. Similarly, in China, theatre commands exist under the PLA, but the PLAAF maintains a degree of strategic autonomy. These examples suggest that a hybrid approach combining joint theatres for operational synergy with functional commands for training, logistics, and strategic roles would be both practical and acceptable to all Services.

In operationalizing the ITCs, it would be logical to merge the existing operational commands into three theatre commands Northern, Western, and Maritime while simultaneously creating a functional Air Defence Command for pan-India air defence. Training and logistics commands such as ARTRAC (Army), Maintenance Command (IAF), and the Southern Naval Command can be retained for their functional roles. Implementation should be gradual and deliberate, incorporating lessons at each stage. In the first phase, existing land-based commands can be combined into Northern and Western Theatres, with one command in each assigned the additional role of Integrated Theatre Command Headquarters. In the second phase, the Air Defence and Maritime Theatre Commands can be established, again with existing commands assuming additional responsibilities. Once these ITCs are stabilized and matured, Cyber and Space Commands can be raised as operational entities.

Each operational ITC should have an Army or Navy Theatre Commander with component commanders from all three Services. The Air Component Commander, a senior IAF officer, should manage all air operations within the theatre. In terms of air asset allocation, it is advisable that air resources remain under centralized control at Air Headquarters until current resource constraints ease. The CDS, through a Joint Operations Centre, should allocate assets dynamically based on theatre needs. This preserves the air power principle of centralized control and decentralized execution.

Before implementing any structural changes, the Services must conduct large-scale tri-service exercises and develop joint doctrines for integrated warfighting. These steps will reduce mistrust and foster operational confidence. A hybrid approach would likely satisfy all Services the Army would achieve joint structures, the Navy would lead the Maritime Theatre, and the Air Force would retain flexibility and agility. This approach also enhances political feasibility, as gradual reform minimizes disruption and ensures cost-effectiveness by reducing duplication without creating an oversized command structure. Most importantly, it enhances operational clarity while maintaining functional specialization.

However, significant challenges remain. Like any major reform, the implementation of ITCs will face resistance and inter-service turf battles. Overcoming these will require strong political will and decisive leadership from the CDS. To ensure effective authority, the CDS’s powers under the Allocation of Business Rules must be clarified and, if necessary, amended. The Services must also cultivate the mindset to embrace change, shifting from Service-specific thinking to mission-oriented jointness. Integration will further require investments in networks, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems, and joint logistics all of which must be adequately funded.

In conclusion, theaterisation is essential for India to effectively fight future multi-domain wars. It is the next crucial step in military integration and must be implemented at the earliest to ensure that the Indian Armed Forces are prepared for the evolving nature of warfare. For these reforms to be both pragmatic and sustainable, a hybrid model combining integrated theatres for operational execution with functional commands for training and strategic roles offers the most balanced and viable path forward.

Author of the Article Lt Gen Philip Campose (Retired), from the Mechanised Infantry, was the 35th Vice Chief of the Indian Army. He superannuated on 1st August 2015 after nearly forty-one years of distinguished service. He has also held the key appointments of General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Command, and Director General, Perspective Planning, at Army Headquarters.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author’s personal opinions and do not represent the official position of any organization.